A Critique of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Guide for International Operations by Griffin, Joseph P.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 11
Issue 2 Summer 1978 Article 3
A Critique of the Justice Department’s Antitrust
Guide for International Operations
Joseph P. Griffin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Griffin, Joseph P. (1978) "A Critique of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Guide for International Operations," Cornell International
Law Journal: Vol. 11: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol11/iss2/3
A CRITIQUE OF THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT'S ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
Joseph P. Grin
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................. 216
I. WHAT THE GUIDE WAS INTENDED TO BE AND NOT TO BE.. 216
A. A Guide to Justice Department Rather Than U.S.
Government Enforcement Policy ........................ 217
B. Not a Gide Binding on the Justice Department ......... '219
C. Not a Guide to Private, State, or Foreign
Antitrust Actions ....................................... 220
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY ............ 222
III. HYPOTHETICAL CASES ...................................... 228
A. Case A: Territorial Allocation by Multinational
Corporations .......................................... 228
B. Case B: Acquisition of a Foreign Firm by an American
Company .............................................. 230
C. Cases C, D, E, & M. Joint Ventures .................... 233
1. Joint Bidding: Case C ............................. 233
2. Joint Research: Case D ............................ 234
3. Manufacturing Joint Venture and Know-How
License: Case E ................................... 236
D. Cases F , H, & P" International Licensing ......... ... 238
1. Know-How License: Case F ....................... 238
2. Tying of Licensing Technology: Case G ........... 239
3. Licensing a State-Owned Enterprise:
Case H ............................................ 240
4. Exclusive Grantback Licensing: Case I ............. 240
t Member of the District of Columbia Bar. Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Wash-
ington, D.C.; Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1966, Uni-
versity of Virginia; J.D. 1971, Georgetown University; Diploma in Law 1973, Oxford
University.
216 CORAELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNL [Vol. 11:215
E. Case J- Exclusive Distributorshis ....................... 241
F. Cases K, L, M, & N Foreign Involvement .............. 242
1. Act of State Defense ............................... 243
2. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion .................... 248
3. Petitioning Foreign Governments .................. 252
CONCLUSION .................................................... 254
INTRODUCTION
The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in January 1977
released a sixty-three page booklet entitled the Antitrust Guidefor Interna-
tional Operations1 (the Guide). The Guide's principal architect, Donald I.
Baker, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
stated at the time that the Guide was being released "for critique and can-
nonade," so that the Division could start a discussion on the issues raised by
the Guide with those outside the Division.2 Later, Douglas E. Rosenthal,
Chief of the Division's Foreign Commerce Section and a major contributor
to the Guide, echoed Mr. Baker's remark, stating that the Guide "is an
invitation to a dialogue. If we are wrong in what we say, tell us."'3 This
Article is intended to contribute to such a discussion.
I
WHAT THE GUIDE WAS INTENDED TO BE AND NOT TO BE
The Guide is an outgrowth of discussions between the Justice Depart-
ment and the President's Export Council.4 Members of the Council be-
lieved that increased international trade and investment were deterred in
certain situations by what they viewed as the unclear enforcement policy of
the Antitrust Division.5 They therefore posed several of these situations to
1. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE], reprinted in ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (1977) and TRADE REG. REPORTS (CCH) No. 266,
pt. 11 (1977).
2. Remarks by Donald I. Baker, then Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, before the Antitrust Law Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, 4ntitrust in the Sunshine 20
(Jan. 26, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). This
speech was later published in a slightly revised form. Baker, Antitrust in the Sunshine 21 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 347 (1977).
3. Address by Douglas E. Rosenthal, then Ass't Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Anti-
trust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Committee, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 9, 1977), reprintedin[1977] 5 TRADE REO. REP. (CCH) 50,309,
at 55,653.
4. The President's Export Council is a group of executives of American-based transna-
tional enterprises that advises a cabinet level committee on export expansion. See generally
Remarks by Baker, supra note 2, at 18, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. at 355.
5. See, e.g, ANTITRUST TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INVESTMENT, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT ON U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS AND AMERICAN Ex-
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the Division as hypothetical cases. The Division's response-the
Guide-comprises two major sections. A nine page Introduction reviews
general principles and policy considerations of antitrust enforcement. The
Guide then analyzes fourteen hypothetical situations in order to illustrate
the thought processes of Division personnel in making enforcement deci-
sions and the factors deemed relevant to those decisions.6
An important threshold criticism of the Guide is that it fails to explain
adequately what it was intended to be and not to be, and that it may there-
fore mislead some people who rely upon it. According to its Preface, the
Guide is intended as a "general statement of enforcement policy for use by
business decision-makers, lawyers, and others concerned with antitrust en-
forcement in the international sector."'7 To their credit, senior Antitrust
Division officials have, since the Guide's publication, emphasized that it is
not "a substitute for. . . experienced private antitrust counsel." 8 Nonethe-
less, some of the Guide's readers, particularly those who do not monitor
speeches and articles by Division personnel, may not fully comprehend the
significance of the Guide's silence on some issues and very brief caveats on
others.
A. A GUIDE TO JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RATHER THAN U.S.
GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT POLICY
Laymen and lawyers who have little experience in the international anti-
trust field are often unaware that more than one federal agency is responsi-
ble for enforcing American antitrust laws in the area of international
business transactions. The Guide is no more than a statement of the en-
PORTS (Feb. 26, 1974) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal);
NATIONAL Ass'N OF MFRS., THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS
(1974); Bus. WEEK, Apr. 10, 1978, at 54. For examples of previous responses by antitrust en-
forcement officials to such criticisms, see Letter from Thomas E. Kauper, then Ass't Attorney
General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Arch N. Booth, President, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (Apr. 26, 1974), reprintedinANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 663, at F-
1 (1974); Remarks by Joel Davidow, then Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Antitrust, International
Mergers and International Joint Ventures (Nov. 12, 1974) (copy on file at the offices of the
CornellInternational Law Journal); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Memorandum Concerning Antitrust
and Foreign Commerce (Jan. 31, 1972), reprinted in [1977] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,129, at 55,208.
6. Address by Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 55,651; Address by Joe Sims, Deputy Ass't Attor-
ney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, InternationalAntitrust: The Rules ofthe Game Get Clearer 5 (Apr. 20, 1977) (copy
on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
7. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at Preface
8. Id at 1. See, e.g, Shenefield, Farewor4 1 REvuE SUISSE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE
LA CONCURRENCE 2, 4 (1977); Address by Donald A. Farmer, Jr., Special Ass't to the Ass't
Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Council of the Americas, An
Overview f/the Justice Department's Guide to International Operations(June 8, 1977), reprinted
in [1977] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,325, at 55,682.
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forcement policies of one of those agencies, the Justice Department. It
"does not describe the Federal Trade Commission's [FTC's] enforcement
policies [and]. . .does not deal with either the Federal Trade Commission
Act or the Clayton Act, as administered by the FTC."9 Although this dis-
claimer appeared in the press release announcing the Guide's issuance, it
does not appear in the Guide itself. In fact, the Introduction to the Guide
states that "we try here to provide a working statement of government en-
forcement policy ... "10 and a few pages later discusses the two major
purposes of "[a]ntitrust enforcement by the United States Government.""1
Perhaps as a result, John T. Fischbach, the Assistant to the General
Counsel for International Affairs at the FTC, was quick to point out that
the Guide "is not a complete directory to United States antitrust laws or
their enforcement," and that businessmen should not be misled "into think-
ing that, if only they comply with the policies set forth in the Guide, they
need not fear any United States antitrust problems."'12 Mr. Fischbach noted
that because section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 13 is broader
than the Sherman 14 and Clayton' 5 Acts, "some of the hypothetical conduct
described in the Guide as lacking characteristics which would cause the
Justice Department to institute proceedings could be viewed differently by
the Federal Trade Commission."'1 6 Furthermore, although the Justice De-
partment declines to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act17 and has advo-
cated that it be substantially modified or repealed,18 the FTC does,
according to Mr. Fischbach, enforce the Act, which applies to international
transactions in some circumstances. 19
9. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release (Jan. 26, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the
Cornell International Law Journal). See also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 121 (No. 2) (1977) ("The
Guide does not cover the enforcement policies of the Federal Trade Commission.").
10. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 1 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 4.
12. Fischbach, Possible 4pplications of United States Restrictive Business Practices Laws to
International Operations--A Few Steps Beyond the United States Department of Justice r '"nti.
trust Guide for International Operations," I REVUE SUISSE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA
CONCURRENCE 48, 48-49 (1977) (footnote omitted).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). For examples of cases involving the FTC and foreign commerce,
see Luria Bros. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968); Branch v.
FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944); Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 7 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1925).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
15. Id §§ 12-27 (1976).
16. Fischbach, supra note 12, at 49-50 (footnote omitted).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
18. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1977).
19. Fischbach, supra note 12, at 58-59. See, eg, Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D.
Loveman & Sons, 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp.
303 (W.D. Pa. 1950). See generallyRill & Frank, Antitrust Consequences of United States Cor-
porate Payments to Foreign Offlcials Applicabilty of Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act
and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 30 VAND. L. REV. 131 (1977).
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In addition to the FTC, the International Trade Commission (ITC) has
some authority to apply the antitrust laws to international transactions. Sec-
tion 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits "unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States
. .. ,,20 The ITC has exclusive primary jurisdiction over Section 337 and
has adopted a broad view of the types of anticompetitive conduct that fall
within its jurisdiction.2 1 Moreover, in two recent cases, the ITC has taken
enforcement positions inconsistent with the Justice Department's views in
the same cases.22 Consequently, the Guide may have little or no effect on
ITC enforcement activities.
B. NOT A GUIDE BINDING ON THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
The Preface to the Guide concludes with the comment that "positions
stated in the Guide should not be regarded as barring any action believed
appropriate under the antitrust laws."'23 This remark is more important
than it may first appear to be to those with little experience in the interna-
tional antitrust field.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976).
21. See Symposiun Section 337 of the Trade Act of 1974, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27
(1978); deKieffer & Hartquist, Unfair Trade Practices and Section 337-Promises and
Uncertainties, 2 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 107 (1977); Minchew, The Expanding Role of the
United States International Trade Commission, 27 MERCER L. Rv. 429 (1976); Brown, Unfair
Methods of Competition in Importation:1 The Expanded Role of the U.S. International Trade
Commission Under § 337 of the Tari§Act of.1930, as Amended by the Trade Act of.1974, 31
Bus. LAW. 1627 (1976); Note, The Revitalization of Section 337 of the TarifrAct of 1930 Under
the TradeAct of.1974, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 167 (1976); N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1977, at 57, col.
5.
22. In Certain Color Television Receiving Sets (337-TA-23), the ITC proceeded against Jap-
anese color television exporters despite Justice Department objections that the Commission
lacked jurisdiction and that the alleged activities of the exporters did not warrant an ITC
proceeding. See Letter from Donald I. Baker, then Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Feb. 16, 1977) (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journal), partially reprinted in TRADE REG. REPORTS
(CCH) No. 274, at 15-16 (1977). For Senator Kennedy's letter to Mr. Baker (Jan. 17, 1977), see
TRADE REG. REPORTS (CCH) No. 269, at 7-8 (1977). The case was eventually settled by a
consent decree. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,492 (1977). For a discussion of this proceeding, see Administra-
tive Survey: October 1976 to September 1977, 10 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 4-9 (1978).
In Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube (337-TA-29), the Justice Department ad-
vised the ITC either to dismiss the complaint or to require submission of supporting informa-
tion from complainants before proceeding. Letter from Jonathan C. Rose, Deputy Ass't
Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Daniel Minchew, Chairman, ITC (Jan. 25, 1977)
(copy on fie at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). The ITC ignored this
advice and proceeded. On February 9, 1978, the ITC held that Japanese steel producers had
violated section 337, and issued a cease and desist order. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Publication
863 (Feb. 22, 1978) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell InternationalLaw Journal). But on
April 24, 1978, President Carter overruled the Commission, in part because of "It]he need to
avoid duplication and conflicts in the administration of the unfair trade practice laws of the
United States." Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Press Release No.
269, at 1 (Apr. 25, 1978) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
23. ANTITRUST GuIDE, supranote 1, at Preface
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Because the Guide is neither a statement of the law nor a body of admin-
istrative rules promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 24
it does not bind the Justice Department. The Antitrust Division is thus still
free to proceed against those who have acted in accordance with their un-
derstanding of the Guide. The Chief of the Division's Intellectual Property
Section has stated:
[Tihe Guide is an informal indication of the enforcement intentions of cur-
rent top officials of the Antitrust Division. Obviously, the enforcement in-
tentions of the officials of the Department in the past and the future may
differ from this .... [T]he Department's legal position will depend primar-
ily on its view of substantive law .... [T]he Department probably will not
(in my view) be willing to engage in a wrangle over the meaning of the Guide
in lieu of arguing the meaning of the statute and case law.25
Moreover, in an interview shortly after the Guide's release, Mr. Baker re-
marked that "you also provide guidance by bringing cases."'26
The Guide's nonbinding nature is obviously reasonable in light of the
accepted rule that one government administration's antitrust enforcement
policy does not bind a subsequent administration and in light of the evolv-
ing nature of the law in the international business area. But the Guide
would be more helpful if its advisory nature were more fully disclosed.
The existing one-sentence caveat, coupled with the Guide's reference to the
possible need to use the Business Review Procedure,27 may not sufficiently
warn all readers that compliance with the Guide does not prevent the Anti-
trust Division from bringing antitrust actions.
C. NOT A GUIDE TO PRIVATE, STATE, OR FOREIGN ANTITRUST
ACTIONS
The scope of the Guide is also limited in several further respects. It does
not mention that private persons, including citizens of foreign countries, 28
may sue to recover treble damages under the Clayton Act.2 9 State 30 and
24. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
25. Address by Richard H. Stem, then Chief, Patent Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, before the Licensing Executives Society 12 (Apr. 1, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of
the Cornell International Law Journal).
26. Bus. WEEK, Mar. 14, 1977, at 100.
27. The Business Review Procedure is "necessary if a firm expression of Antitrust Division
views is desired in regard to particular transactions which pose close or difficult antitrust ques-
tions." ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote I, at 1.
28. Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., [1977] 1
Trade Cas. 161,256 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375
F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa.), modfedinpar 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
30. For an example of a state suing on its own behalf, see Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159
(1942). For examples of states suing as parens patriae, see Burch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 554 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1977); Washington v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 834, at D-5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 1977). See also 15 U.S.C.
§ 15(c) (1976).
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foreign 3' governments may also bring actions under that Act. All of these
"persons" may have substantial incentives to sue when, for reasons of en-
forcement policy, comity, or lack of resources, the Justice Department does
not prosecute. 32
The Guide also fails to point out that state antitrust laws may apply to
international operations. Many state laws are patterned after federal anti-
trust laws, and provide for private rights of action.33 Where international
transactions have some contacts with a state, that state's antitrust laws are a
potential source of liability.34
The Guide does not purport to advise its readers on how to conform their
conduct to the requirements of the antitrust laws of foreign nations. Many
corporate counsel advise their clients that the American antitrust laws are
the strictest in the world and that if the clients operate abroad in a manner
consistent with American antitrust laws, they will automatically comply
with less strict foreign laws. 35 Although the validity of such advice was
always doubtful, today it is clearly wrong. As Joel Davidow, the Justice
Department's representative in the United Nations forums, recently stated,
compliance with the Guide does not assure a transnational enterprise that it
will be considered a good corporate citizen in developing countries.36
31. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978). Legislation is pending in Con-
gress that would overrule this decision. E.g., H.R. 11942, 124 CONG. REC. H2615 (1978). See
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 858, at A-1 (1978).
32. Two current examples of such situations are the pending cases involving the alleged
international uranium cartel, and the claims by American manufacturers of electronic prod-
ucts that Japanese producers of similar products violated several antitrust laws. TVA v.
Urangesellschaft, GmbH & Co., No. 77 Civ. 5617 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Rio Algom Ltd., No. 76 C 3830 (N.D. Ill. 1976); In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contracts Litigation, M.D.L. No. 235 (E.D. Va. 1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See generally Hearings on International Uranium
Cartel Before the Subcoma. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
33. SeeAMERICAN BAR AsS'N, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS (1974). In 1976, Congress author-
ized the expenditure ofS10 million per year for three years for grants to state attorneys general
who submit approved plans for improving the effectiveness of state antitrust enforcement pro-
grams. 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (1976).
34. See, e.g, Rosack v. Volvo of America Corp., [1977] 1 Trade Cas. 61,395 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1977).
35. See Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What Is Covered?, 8 CORNELL
INr'L L.J. 1 (1974); Address by Joel Davidow, then Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Anti-
trust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Eleventh New England Antitrust Conference, For-
eign and International Antitrust: Variations on the Themes of U.S. Law 1-2 (Nov. 18, 1977)
(copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
36. Id at 10.
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II
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY
The Introduction is the most useful part of the Guide. It is a well-written,
concise, and comprehensive expression of the Division's enforcement pol-
icy. With one exception,37 it contains nothing new or controversial. The
most important single quality of the Introduction is its balanced tone, which
undercuts some critics' assertions that Antitrust Division officials are zealots
who consider themselves to be world policemen of restrictive business prac-
tices and who automatically apply domestic antitrust precedents to interna-
tional situations. 38
The Introduction to the Guide states that enforcement policy "should
avoid unnecessary interference with the sovereign interests of foreign na-
tions."' 39 Senior Justice Department officials have elaborated on this state-
ment in recent speeches. Both Attorney General Griffin B. Bell and
Associate Attorney General Michael J. Egan have stated that comity4°
should be a major consideration in the Justice Department's international
antitrust enforcement efforts.41 To give effect to this position, the Depart-
ment recently adopted a new policy of "notify[ing] any foreign government
at any time that an Antitrust Division official wishes to conduct investiga-
tive interviews or other official business within its territory."' 42 This policy
apparently was precipitated by the rediscovery of a World War I statute
dealing with foreign actions on U.S. soil43 and by foreign outrage over the
Justice Department's involvement in efforts to obtain information about the
alleged international uranium cartel.44 Like the Guide, the new attitude
37. See notes 66-81 infra and accompanying text.
38. "[Plurely domestic decisions may not be readily generalized to the international con-
text." ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at I n.l.
39. Id at 6-7.
40. The doctrine of comity provides that, in order to reach an internationally acceptable
accommodation with other nations, states will refrain from fully exercising their power on the
basis of politeness, convenience, and goodwill. The doctrine is based upon mutual respect, but
it is not binding. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-66 (1895); Yntema, The Comity Doc-
trine 65 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1966).
41. Address by Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney General, before the American Bar Ass'n (Aug.
8, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journa); Address by
Michael J. Egan, Assoc. Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Business Law
Section, International Bar Ass'n (Nov. 3, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell Inter.
national Law Journal).
42. Address by Egan, supra note 41, at 9. See also Address by Joe Sims, Deputy Ass't
Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Practicing Law Institute,
he Justice Department's InternationalAntitrust Program 14 (Jan. 20, 1978) (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell InternationalLaw Journal) ("[Wle have been trying to find ways to carry
out our mandate to protect American consumers from foreign anticompetitive activities in
ways which do not raise the hackles of foreign governments quite so dramatically.").
43. 18 U.S.C § 951 (1976); Address by Egan, supranote 41, at 10.
44. SeeANrrRUsr & TRADE RaG. REP. (BNA) No. 829, at A-8 (Sept. 1, 1977). Canada
adopted Uranium Information Security Regulations, SOR/77-836, 111 Can. Gaz. pt. II, at
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reflects both a deliberate effort to achieve flexibility in enforcement policy
and a recognition that a pax Americana in antitrust enforcement is neither
feasible nor desirable.45
The Guide states that, except in the area of per se horizontal restraints,
the test of the legality of international trade restraints is the rule of reason.
More importantly, the Guide acknowledges that the rule of reason may per-
mit a wider range of anticompetitive activities when either "(1) experience
with adverse effects on competition is much more limited than in the do-
mestic market, or (2) there are some special justifications not normally
found in the domestic market."'46 The Guide's conclusion that "[e]ither
circumstance could justify a fuller factual inquiry"47 constitutes an impor-
tant48 and welcome concession in the Antitrust Division's enforcement pol-
4619 (1977) (replacing Uranium Information Security Regulations SOR/76-644, 110 Can.
Gaz. pt. II, at 2747 (1976)), to prevent disclosure of uranium cartel information. For two cases
involving these regulations, see In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation,
563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co. (D.N.M. 1978),
reprintedin 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 376 (1978). Australia has a similar new law. Foreign
Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121 (Austl.), as amended by
Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, 1976, No. 202
(Austl.), as implemented by Order of the Attorney General, Austl. Gov't Gaz. No. S214 (Nov.
29, 1976), No. 237 (Dec. 23, 1976), and No. 239 (Dec. 24, 1976). The House of Lords refused to
order certain British executives to provide evidence concerning uranium in response to letters
rogatory from a U.S. federal district court. In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract
Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977). See generalyNote, Discovery in Great Britain: 7he
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 323 (1978); Wash-
ington Post, Dec. 11, 1977, at KI, col. 2; FORBES, Nov. 15, 1977, at 45; THE ECONOMIST, Aug.
20, 1977, at 77.
For earlier examples of foreign statutes enacted in response to U.S. antitrust proceedings,
see Law of June 28, 1956, [1956] Staatsblad [Stb.] 461 (Neth.), as amended by Law of July 16,
1958, § 39, [1958] Stb. 413 (Neth.); Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964,
c. 87 (U.K.), modofed by Transfer of Functions (Shipping and Construction of Ships) Order,
1965 Stat. Inst. No. 145 (U.K.), as amended bylndustrial Expansion Act, 1968, c. 32, §§ 14(l),
18(2), sched. 4 (U.K.); Law of May 24, 1965, § 11, [1965] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] II 835 (W.
Ger.); Business Concerns Records Act, QUE. REv. STAT. c. 278 (1961); Business Records Pro-
tection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 54 (1970). The British and West German statutes were enacted
in reaction to a 1960 investigation of multinational shipping conferences, In re Grand Jury
Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960). See generally Note,
Discovery ofDocuments LocatedAbroadin U.. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the
Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excusefor Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747
(1974).
45. For other indications of the flexibility and importance of comity, see Competitive Im-
pact Statement on United States v. Bechtel Corp., 42 Fed. Reg. 3718 (1977), and United States
v. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 41 Fed. Reg. 32,615 (1976).
46. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 2-3. In a recent speech, Attorney General Griffin B.
Bell noted that a "current major concern is that the realities of foreign competition should be
considered in the enforcement of the antitrust laws." Address by Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney
General, before The University Club 10 (Dec. 14, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the
Cornell International Law Journal).
47. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 3.
48. The argument made on appeal in BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977),
shows the importance of this concession. The British Government as amicus curiae there ar-
gued on BOC International's behalf that "a foreign firm seeking to enter a market in another
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icy. Unfortunately, the Guide's hypothetical cases nowhere develop this
broader rule of reason test. For example, the hypothetical involving a U.S.
firm's acquisition of a foreign company4 9 does not mention the special
problems of entering a foreign market.50 Future editions of the Guide
ought to present and discuss the factors that the Division considers impor-
tant to an "international rule of reason" analysis.
The Guide's description of subject matter jurisdiction is, for the most
part, lucid and helpful. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the Guide per-
petuates the "magic words" approach to the "effects" test of subject matter
jurisdiction.5 ' At one point the Guide states that the test for jurisdiction is
whether the conduct in question has "a substantial and foreseeable effect on
U.S. commerce."'5 2 On the very next page, the formula is changed to re-
quire a "direct or intended effect."'53 Presumably there is no difference in
these two formulations; unfortunately, they merely add to the existing case
law formulas, which include "affects," 5 4 "directly affects," 55 "substantially
affects,"'5 6 "directly and substantially (or materially) affects," 57 and has an
country faces numerous additional commercial, cultural, and legal barriers which do not con-
front firms expanding inside a single nation." Brief for Amicus Curiae at 19 (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journa). Although the Second Circuit did not reach
this contention in its decision, such considerations are likely to become increasingly important
under the Guide's formulation of the international rule of reason.
49. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 15 (Case B).
50. For an examination of the business difficulties a foreign firm encounters upon entering
an American market, see Wall St. J., May 3, 1978, at 44, col. 1; id, Dec. 16, 1977, at I, col. 1.
51. See generaly Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sher-
man Antitrust Ac4 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 199 (1977); Ongman, "Be No Longer a
Chaos Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional
Scope 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 733 (1977). The European Communities have adopted the "effects"
test of subject matter jurisdiction. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 31-32 (1977).
52. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 6. This formula is similar to that in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965) ("direct and
foreseeable result").
53. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 7.
54. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 445 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Flynn-Learner, [1963] Trade Cas.
% 70,732, at 77,901 (D. Hawaii 1963); Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764, 766
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd and modfed, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. Na-
tional Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aft'dand moded, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
55. See, e.g., Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586, 587
(E.D. Pa. 1974); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03
(C.D. Cal. 1971), aifdper curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972);
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),sulppe-
mental opinion, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
56. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976); Vanity
Fair Mills, Inc. v. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
57. See, e.g, United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., [1963] Trade
Cas. 9170,600, at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), ordermodpFed, [1965] Trade Cas. 9171,352 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); United States v. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957); United States v.
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"impact upon." 58
The differences among these formulas are more apparent than real. They
do not use legal reasoning, but merely state a conclusion that the connec-
tion between the restraint and U.S. commerce is sufficient to warrant a
finding of subject matter jurisdiction. In recent interstate commerce cases,
the Supreme Court has held that the effect of the restraint upon commerce
must be viewed "in a practical sense." 59 Similarly, in Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank ofAmerica,6 cited in a footnote to the Guide's discussion of
subject matter jurisdiction, 61 the Ninth Circuit held that the "effects test by
itself is incomplete" 62 and suggested that the proper standard is a "jurisdic-
tional rule of reason."63 Because of this increasing emphasis on case by
case determinations, the Guide would be more useful if it stated and ana-
lyzed those factors that justify an assertion of subject matter jurisdiction,
rather than presented aphoristic tests of jurisdiction.64
The one controversial position stated in the Introduction raises a long-
debated issue of subject matter jurisdiction that is of considerable academic
but little practical importaice.65 According to the Guide, it is not the De-
partment's policy "to apply the Sherman Act to a combination of U.S. firms
for foreign activities which have no direct or intended effect on United
States consumers or export opportunities. '66 Mr. Rosenthal has advanced
three arguments in support of this position:
(1) "There is not a shred of evidence that any of those who sponsored the
Sherman Act intended it as a magna carta of competition for the benefit of
foreign persons in foreign markets, to hold to account United States export-
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949) ("direct and influencing"),
af'd and modoed, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753,
891 (D.N.J. 1949), modoed, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v. Hamburg-
Amerikanisehe Packet-Fahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 200 F. 806, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), modofed,
216 F. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), rev'das moot, 239 U.S. 466 (1916).
58. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705
(1962); Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., [1977] 1
Trade Cas. 61,256, at 70,783 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Raubal v. Engelhard Minerals & Chems.
Corp., 364 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("impact" on commerce).
59. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 745 n.3 (1976);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784 n.11 (1975) and cases cited therein.
60. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
61. ANTITRUST GUIDE, sulpranote 1, at 7 n.14.
62. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 611 (9th Cir. 1976).
63. Id at 613.
64. See, e.g, 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 260-66 (1978).
65. The issue is principally of academic importance because "even anticompetitive agree-
ments specifically designed to injure or disadvantage foreigners frequently have easily foresee-
able anticompetitive consequences upon domestic consumers." Address by Donald A. Farmer,
Jr., Special Ass't to the Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the
Council of the Americas, An Overview ofthe Justice Department's Guide to International Opera-
tions (June 8, 1977), refprinted in [1977] 5 TRADE REG. RE'. (CCH) 50,325.
66. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 7.
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ers engaged in restrictive practices in those markets."67
(2) Existing cases go no further than to hold that "foreign plaintiffs in-
jured in foreign markets can sue under the Sherman Act where they can
show that the restraints that injured them injured others in United States
markets as well."68
(3) The U.S. Government need not prosecute such restraints because
other governments have their own antitrust enforcement capabilities and
because they are not likely to interpret American inaction as approval of
such activities or as a retreat into isolation.69
These arguments invite the following replies:
(1) There is no evidence that the Sherman Act's sponsors did not intend
the Act to protect persons injured in foreign markets by American export-
ers. The legislative history of the Act is silent on the issue, and numerous
decisions have noted that legislative intent may not be inferred from legisla-
tive silence.70
(2) Where both foreigners and persons in American markets have been
injured, the courts have not made injury to persons in U.S. markets a pre-
requisite to jurisdiction.71 Moreover, it would be anomalous to define a
statute's reach by reference to whether the allegedly unlawful conduct si-
multaneously injured someone other than the complainant.72
(3) Numerous policy considerations militate against a policy of acquies-
cence. For example, failure to prosecute U.S. firms for their anticompeti-
tive conduct abroad could (a) injure the foreign subsidiaries of American
corporations and individual Americans living abroad; (b) make the domes-
tic operations of the conspirators less competitive; (c) cause foreign govern-
ments to adopt similarly lenient policies, possible injuring American
consumers and businesses; and (d) make the anitcompetitive conduct unas-
sailable, since many foreign governments do not apply their antitrust laws
67. Address by Douglas E. Rosenthal, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the American Society of International Law, Subject Maler Juris-
diction in United States Export Trade 8-9 (Apr. 23, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the
Cornell InternationalLaw Journal), partially reprinted in7l AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 214,217
(1977).
68. Id at 14 (this portion of the speech is not reprinted in the PROCEEDINGS).
69. Id at 17, 71 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. at 218-19.
70. See, e.g, Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S.
61, 69 (1946); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940).
71. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978); Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v.
Societe Anonyme de Gerance et D'Armement, 451 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denie4 406
U.S. 906 (1972); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D.
Pa.), modofedinpar4 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
72. In United States v. Learner Co., 215 F. Supp. 603 (D. Hawaii 1963), one of the alleged
violations of the Sherman Act was the fixing and maintaining of identical or similar terms and
prices by American exporters of scrap metal to Japan. Although the indictment survived a
motion to dismiss, id, the Government later successfully moved to dismiss the indictment with
prejudice, [1961-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,062 at 52,478.
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extraterritorially.73
The Guide apparently includes an intended effect on U.S. commerce as
an element of the jurisdictional test applied to foreign activity of American
companies. But in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,74 the court
stated that intent was a requirement only as to the foreign conduct of alien
companies.7 5 Moreover, at least one court has rejected an American com-
pany's defense of lack of an intent to restrain trade.76
Although the commentators have debated these confficting contentions
adinfinitum, if not adnauseam,77 the issue remains for the courts to resolve
definitively. Consequently, the precise scope of the Sherman Act and the
test for determining whether specific conduct falls within its prohibitions
remain unclear.
Since 190978 no American court has failed to find subject matter jurisdic-
tion in a case brought under the Sherman Act. Moreover, the likelihood is
small that a situation as carefully confined as Mr. Rosenthars example of a
precisely targeted conspiracy79 would actually arise, because companies
often have no control over the effects of their anticompetitive conduct. In
fact, one of Mr. Rosenthal's colleagues in the Division has stated that "even
anticompetitive agreements specifically designed to injure or disadvantage
foreigners frequently have easily foreseeable anticompetitive consequences
upon domestic consumers. 80 Thus, as one distinguished commentator has
noted, Mr. Rosenthal's thesis constitutes more of a problem for other com-
mentators than for businessmen.81
73. Rahl, A Rejoinder, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 42 (1974); Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy,
and International Buying Cooperatiog 84 YALE L.J. 268, 275-78 (1974).
74. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
75. Id at 444-45.
76. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309-10 (N.D. Ohio 1949),
a'd and modpea; 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
77. See, e.g, K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 82 (1958);
Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teaot4 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
16 (1974); Rahl, supra note 38; Comments by Stefan A. Riesenfeld, 71 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC., supra note 67, at 219.
78. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
79. Mr. Rosenthal's example is as follows: Speed and Sneed are Delaware corporations and
significant competitors in the worldwide peanut butter industry. They manufacture peanut
butter in the southeastern United States. Each agrees to ship peanut butter from its plant at a
jointly agreed price to customers in the Kingdom of Rex, in North Africa. They do not sell
peanut butter anywhere else. R. Company, a private firm incorporated in Rex, distributes in
Rex the peanut butter it buys from a citizen of Rex who acts as a sales agent for both Speed
and Sneed in Rex. The peanut butter is delivered to R. Company from a warehouse leased by
the sales agent. Address by Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 216.
80. Address by Donald A. Farmer, Jr., Special Ass't to the Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Council of the Americas, An Overview of the Justice
Department'r Guide to International Operations (June 8, 1977), reprinted in [1977] 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,325, at 55,684.
81. Comments by G. Winthrop Haight, 71 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc., supra note 67, at 222.
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III
HYPOTHETICAL CASES
The Guide presents fourteen hypothetical situations designed to illustrate
how the Division reaches enforcement decisions. The authors of the Guide
acknowledge that, because the analysis of each case relies heavily on the
rule of reason, each "turns heavily on [the] facts."82 Thus, a slight change
in the facts may produce a different result. The analyses are nonetheless
helpful, according to Joe Sims, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, because
they demonstrate the Division's approach to international issues.8 3 The
hypotheticals would have been more helpful if the Guide had illustrated
how the broader international rule of reason is to be applied,84 and had
distinguished the factors of greater analytical importance from those of
lesser significance.
A. CASE A: TERRITORIAL ALLOCATION BY MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
Case A8 5 is derived from the facts of Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States,86 and involves an international manufacturing corporation that co-
ordinates its worldwide activities through a group of subsidiaries, each of
which conducts all of the parent corporation's business in an assigned terri-
tory. The Guide concludes that "a parent corporation may allocate territo-
ries or set prices for the subsidiaries that it fully controls. T87 Control
depends on whether the parent owns a majority of the voting stock, or, if
the parent is a minority shareholder, whether it exerts "effective working
control." 8 8
This statement of the Division's policy on the opaque doctrine of in-
traenterprise conspiracy 89 will come as a relief to those who have read
Timken and related cases9 ° as holding that American firms cannot lawfully
82. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 9. "Of course no Guide can make the hard cases
easy: such cases will surely turn on slight variations of fact and policy judgments." Address by
Baker, supra note 2, at 16. "All cases are different, and in this area more than most, antitrust
results will turn on specific facts." Address by Sims, supra note 42, at 23.
83. Address by Sims, supra note 6, at 6.
84. Seetext accompanying notes 49 & 50 supra
85. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 10-14.
86. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
87. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 12.
88. Id at 13.
89. See J. VON KALINOWSi, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 6.01[2][c], in 16
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (1969); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corpo-
rate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 20 (1968); Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Sec-
tion I of the Sherman 4ct:.A Suggested Standard, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 717 (1977).
90. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968);
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). For recent cases applying the
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organize foreign subsidiaries and then allocate markets among and estab-
lish prices for them.91 Nevertheless, the Guide's reliance on the test of
effective working control may in some cases be too narrow and inflexible.
In contrast to the great importance that the Guide places on the issue of
control, some courts have considered control to be only one factor to be
considered along with such others as the firms' independence of action, the
degree to which they compete with each other or are held out to the public
as competitors, and whether they were created or acquired to effect an-
ticompetitive purposes.92 Professor Hawk has offered, as an example of a
situation in which the Guide's control-based analysis is too narrow, the case
of a multinational corporation compelled by the country in which its sub-
sidiary is located to hold only a small minority stock interest in the subsidi-
ary.93
The Guide's consideration of intraenterprise conspiracy also contains an
important and restrictive caveat: the control test "Would still allow use of
the Sherman Act to reach coercive attempts by members of a corporate
group to drive third parties out of business or out of markets."'94 This brief
statement raises several questions that the Guide ought to address: What
factors are relevant in determining whether there is a lawful expansion of
market share or an unlawful conspiracy? Is it logical to argue that, even
though the parent controls the subsidiary, the two entities can conspire if
they intend to lower prices in order to drive third parties out of business,
but not if they intend to raise prices? And finally, how, if at all, does a pre-
existing stock affiliation between potential competitors affect the analysis? 95
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine in an international context, see International Rys. of Cent.
America v. United Brands Co. 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976);
Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For other international cases,
see W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 319-24 (2d ed. 1973).
91. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 88 (1955); Carlston, Foreign Economic Policy and the Antitrust Laws, 40 MINN.
L. REV. 125, 140 (1956).
92. See, e.g, Brager & Co. v. Leumi Sec. Corp., 429 F. Supp. 1341, 1345-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
93. Hawk, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Competition, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 241, 252-53 (1977).
94. ANTITRUST GUnE, supra note 1, at 12 n.26. This is consistent with the position of
"most" members of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
that "when a parent and its subsidiary, though short of an attempt to monopolize, nonetheless
plan to drive out a competitor, Section 1 [of the Sherman Act] may be transgressed." REPORT
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 35
(1955).
95. See B. HAWK, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 138 (manuscript to be published in 1978)
(copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
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B. CASE B: ACQUISITION OF A FOREIGN FIRM BY AN AMERICAN
COMPANY
Case B96 deals with the purchase of a small foreign specialty manufac-
turer by a large American firm, the leader in its industry. At the time of
the purchase, the foreign firm is marketing a new product that is arguably
superior to those of the American corporation. These facts are a variation
of those in United States v. Gillette Co. 9
The Guide first notes that the Antitrust Division supports congressional
efforts to overturn the requirement laid down in United States v. American
Building Maintenance Industries98 that the acquired firm be engaged in
commerce. The analysis then turns to the issue of potential competition by
the foreign firm99 and provides a list of four factors to be considered in
determining whether the acquisition would violate the Clayton Act:
[Wlhether (1) the U.S. market (or relevant local market) is highly concen-
trated; (2) the foreign firm is by virtue of its capability of entering the market
one of a relatively small group of potential entrants; (3) the foreign firm has
the incentives to enter the U.S. market; and (4) the foreign firm has the capa-
bility of entering the market or threatening to enter. If all these factors are
present, a merger between such a firm and a leading American firm may well
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act .... l00
Most courts have been careful to distinguish between the "perceived po-
tential entrant" and the "actual potential entrant" aspects of the potential
competition doctrine. Although some cases have involved only one of
these,101 both often arise in the same case, because a firm can be a per-
ceived and an actual potential entrant simultaneously. 102
The perceived potential entrant theory, accepted as valid by the Supreme
Court, 03 focuses on the present effect of a potential entrant on an oligop-
olistic market. If oligopolists perceive that one or more companies outside
96. ANIrUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 15.
97. 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975) (approving a modified consent decree). For the origi-
nal consent decree, see [1976] 1 Trade Cas. 1 60,691. The Competitive Impact Statement is
reprinted at 40 Fed. Reg. 27,269 (1975).
98. 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
99. In February 1977, then Assistant Attorney General Baker stated that "recent judicial
hostility to potential competition theory has probably influenced our decision to allocate some
of our enforcement resources to other areas." Remarks by Donald I. Baker, then Ass't Attor-
ney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Southwestern Legal Foundation,
Government Litigation Under Section 7 The Old Merger Guidelines and the New Antitrust Ma-
jority 10-11 (Feb. 24, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law
Journal).
100. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 16.
101. See, e.g, BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1977); FTC v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 549 F.2d 289, 293 n.6 (4th Cir. 1977).
102. See, e.g, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534-36 n.13 (1973);
FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
103. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 625 (1974); United States
CRITIQUE OF THE GUIDE
the market may enter it, the insiders may keep prices and profit margins
below levels that would induce the outsiders to penetrate the market. By
contrast, if the perceived potential entrant acquires a large firm already in
the market, the possibility of its entering the market by internal expansion
or a toehold acquisition' °4 disappears, as does the procompetitive "wings"
or "edge" effect on prices. Thus, the acquisition of a large firm in the mar-
ket by a perceived potential entrant may decrease competition and violate
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.105
The second branch of the potential competition doctrine is the actual po-
tential entrant theory. Although lower courts °6 and the Federal Trade
Commission10 7 have accepted this theory, the Supreme Court has twice re-
fused to rule on its validity. 10 8 This approach focuses not on the percep-
tions of firms already in the market, but on the means of market entry
chosen by a potential entrant and on how that entry affects future competi-
tion in a concentrated market. If the potential entrant enters the market by
internal expansion or a toehold acquisition, a new competitor will be cre-
ated, reducing market concentration and fostering competition. But if the
outsider penetrates the market by acquiring a larger present market mem-
ber, the acquisition removes the future procompetitive effect that would
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405
U.S. 562, 567 (1972).
104. A toehold acquisition involves the purchase of a small competitor in the market. See
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 864-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denie4 419
U.S. 883 (1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 77-78 n.8 (10th Cir. 1972); The
Budd Co., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,998 (FTC 1975). See gen-
erally Fox, Toehold Acquisitions, Potential Toehold Acquisitions and Section 7 of the Clayton
Ac4 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 573 (1973); Note, 89 HARV. L. REv. 800 (1976).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Although the cases are not entirely consistent, the following
factors are usually among those considered in evaluating whether there has been a violation of
the perceived potential entrant theory: (1) whether the target market is concentrated; (2)
whether the acquired firm is larger than a mere toehold; (3) whether the acquiring company is
perceived by those in the target market as one of a small group of likely potential entrants; (4)
whether the perception of the acquiring company as a likely entrant has had a procompetitive
effect in the target market; (5) whether there are feasible alternative means of entry for the
perceived potential entrant other than acquiring a large existing member of the market; and (6)
whether the acquisition will increase barriers to entry into the market. See generally Hood,
Potential Competitio 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 485 (1976); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and
Section 7 of the Clayton Ac4 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313 (1965); Note, The Potential Competition
Doctrine.4fter Marine Bancorporatiog 63 GEo. L.J. 969 (1975).
106. FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); Missouri Portland Cement
Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denie4 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Ekco Products Co.
v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp.
1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aft'dmem, 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
107. Warner-Lambert Co., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,141
(FTC 1976); Beatrice Foods Co., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,944
(FTC 1975), aff'4 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976); British Oxygen, [1973-76 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,063 (FTC 1975), rev'dandremande4 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
108. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 625 (1974); United States
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973).
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have resulted from its probable entry de novo or by a toehold acquisition.
Elimination of probable future competition caused by the potential en-
trant's acquisition of a large existing firm may thus violate section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
In BOC International Ltd v. Federal Trade Commission,'0 9 the Second
Circuit held that application of the actual potential entrant theory depends
on the answers to two questions: "First, would the firm in question enter de
novo or by toehold acquisition if not permitted to enter by acquiring a large
company? Second, would the de novo or toehold entry of the firm have
procompetitive effects on the market in question?" ' 10 These two questions
raise the further issues of what types of evidence would suffice to establish
that the acquiring firm would have entered the market but for the acquisi-
tion, ItI and how to prove the probability of future procompetitive effects of
an entry. In any event, the factors determinative of an acquisition's legality
clearly vary for each of the two aspects of the potential competition doc-
trine.
The Guide's analysis of the hypothetical acquisition oversimplifies the
potential competition doctrine by failing to explain its two different
branches. Although the Guide at one point appears to refer to the actual
potential entrant theory, 112 this reference does not elaborate on the factors
peculiar to this theory. As currently written, the Guide also fails to set
forth the factors the Division would consider in analyzing a foreign merger
as opposed to a purely domestic one, 1 3 and fails to discuss such other im-
portant possible anticompetitive aspects of mergers as a potential for reci-
procity" 4 and the entrenchment of existing market power." 5  The
Division could remedy these deficiencies by including several hypotheticals
dealing with mergers and acquisitions.
In the Guide's discussion of merger law, footnote 32 contains an unfortu-
nate ambiguity that warrants clarification. In treating monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 116 the footnote correctly cites the
Grinnell test' 17 of illegality. The final sentence of the footnote, however,
109. 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
110. Id at 26-27 (footnotes omitted).
111. See Mr. Justice Marshall's statements concerning objective versus subjective evidence
in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 548, 566 (1973) (concurring opinion).
112."If Glint's new type of blade is shown to be clearly superior to blades now sold in the
U.S., this raises some inference that Glint might enter the U.S. market to exploit the blade and
that its entrance might have a significant procompetitive impact in the U.S. market." ANTI-
TRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 17.
113. See Note, Foreign Acquisitions in the United States: A Challenge to the Potential Com-
petition Doctrine 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 301 (1975).
114. See, e.g, FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
115. See, e.g, FrC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
117. "The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
CRITIQUE OF THE GUIDE
states that "the requisite willfulness or intent may be found if the corpora-
tion has bought up the offeror of a new competitive product for the appar-
ent purpose of creating or maintaining that monopoly power."118  Some
commentators have noted that this statement could be read to mean that a
specific intent to monopolize must be shown in order to establish a violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act."f9 Of course, section 2 does not require a
specific intent in order to establish monopolization in violation of the
Act.120
C. CASES C, D, E, & M: JOINT VENTURES
The Guide presents four hypothetical cases involving joint ventures.
The Guide's more lengthy consideration of this topic reflects the frequent
criticism by businessmen of the Antitrust Division's approach to joint ven-
tures in the past. For example, a 1974 report of the National Association of
Manufacturers remarked that "antitrust restriction to foreign joint venture
formation is the most often cited problem in the field of internationally
applied antitrust." 121
1. Joint Bidding: Case C
In Case C,122 a consortium of electrical equipment manufacturers and
engineering firms organize to bid on a large Latin American hydroelectric
project. The consortium is similar to one that the Division approved in a
1976 business review letter. 123 According to the Guide, "[n]ormally, the
Department would not challenge a merger or joint venture whose only ef-
fect was to reduce competition among the parties in a foreign market, even
where goods or services were being exported from the United States."'124
Unless the joint venture is assumed not to "foreclose export opportunities
for U.S. firms,"'125 this position conflicts with the Guide's earlier statement
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power .... United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
118. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote I, at 17 n.32.
119. See, e.g, Hawk, supra note 93, at 254.
120. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 622 (1953); United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948).
121. NATIONAL ASS'N OF MFRS., supra note 5, at 4. See also CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
supra note 5, at 2; Bus. WEEK, sulra note 5, at 60. The Division has usually replied to such
criticisms by pointing out that "there [have been] no suits brought... in the last twenty-five
years ... against joint ventures by Americans to sell a product abroad or construct a facility
in a foreign country." Davidow, Recent Developments in International,4ntitrus 10 AKRON L.
REv. 603, 606 (1977). See also Letter from Thomas E. Kauper, supra note 5, at F-1.
122. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 19.
123. Id at 21 n.39. For an excellent discussion of the legality of international buying groups
formed by American firms, see Davidow, supra note 73.
124. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 21.
125. Id
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that a major purpose of antitrust enforcement "is to protect American
export and investment opportunities against privately imposed restric-
tions."1 26
If the joint venture does have an anticompetitive effect on U.S. export
commerce, then it is subject to the Sherman Act. The Division's decision
not to challenge the venture would then have to rest on policy considera-
tions rather than on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Guide men-
tions such policy factors as the venture's short-term nature, the large risks
and dollar amounts involved, and the need for complementary skills. The
discussion also appears to imply that the international rule of reason would
apply to the joint venture and to any resulting collateral restraints. The
Guide's approach is thus more flexible than that employed by the courts.
In most international joint venture cases, courts have focused first on the
venture's purpose, to determine whether the venture is merely one part of a
larger conspiracy or plan and whether the purpose of the venturers is to
restrain trade. 127 If no such broader conspiracy or purpose exists, courts
have then examined the reasonableness of the venture and the resulting
collateral restraints. The Guide acknowledges that the hypothetical project
in Case C is too large for any single member to perform alone, and so it is
deemed reasonable. The Guide thereby avoids the issue of whether it
would be reasonable for the participants to undertake the project as a joint
venture in order to offer a more enticing bid, even though each member was
individually capable of performing the project alone.
The discussion of "bottleneck" joint ventures in Cases C and M 128
should be expanded to address such questions as whether both foreign and
domestic competitors must be considered in determining if a bottleneck ex-
ists, and whether, if there are two or three joint ventures among different
members of an industry, a competitor excluded from all of them has a rem-
edy under the bottleneck theory.
2 Joint Research: Case D
The second largest U.S. producer and one of the largest Common Market
producers of a hypothetical metal combine in Case D to develop jointly a
new process for producing the metal. The discussion of this case is generally
consistent with the position taken by the Division in the past, 129 although it
126. Id at 5.
127. United tates v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 312 (N.D. Ohio 1949),
afl'd and modfle4 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See generallyAtwood, International Joint Ventures and
the U.S. Antitrust Law4 10 AKRON L. REV. 609 (1977); Joelson & Griffin, Multinational Joint
Ventures and the U.S. Antitrust LawS 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 487 (1975).
128. ANTITRUST GumE, supra note 1, at 21-22, 59-60.
129. See Remarks by Thomas E. Kauper, then Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, before the Seminar on Institutional and Legal Constraints to Cooperative
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reflects a reduced emphasis on the relative size of the competitors. 130
Some readers of the Guide may not immediately sense the importance of
the statement that "a territorial division created explicitly by such [patent]
rights is not now regarded by the Department as being illegal in itseyfunder
the antitrust laws."' 131 Although courts have approved patent license pro-
visions that divide territories between licensee and licensor and prohibit
each from selling in the other's territory, 132 Antitrust Division officials have
criticized these decisions as being overly broad. Such contractual provi-
sions, the Division officials said, would be "looked at with great suspi-
cion." 133 Thus, although such a provision may not be "illegal in itself," it
may still trigger a time-consuming and expensive investigation by the Anti-
trust Division.
The only government antitrust suits involving joint research ventures
have involved the additional element of patent pooling.134 In these cases,
patent pooling eliminated existing and potential competition in research
and development by removing commercial incentives for separate firms to
engage in innovative endeavors. 135 Nevertheless, patent pools are not per
Energy Research and Development (Dec. 16, 1974), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE Rao.
REP. (BNA) No. 694, at A-3 (1974); Turner, Joint Ventures, Acquisitions and Merger9 LEs
NOUVELLEs, Nov. 1968, at 32, reprinted in 2 THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING 743 (M.
Finnegan & R. Goldscheider eds. 1977); Remarks by Donald I. Baker, then Deputy Ass't
Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the U.S. League of Savings
Associations' 82d Annual Convention, Antitrust as a Positive Force in Relation to Financial
Joint Ventures 12 (Nov. 13, 1974), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
691, at D-1 (1974); Address by Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, FTC, before the Economic Club
of Detroit (Mar. 12, 1962), reprinted in id No. 35, at X-4 (1962).
130. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 24. Turner, supranote 129, at 753 ("[T]he legality
ofjoint research ventures among competitors is, I believe, most likely to be determined primar-
ily on the relative size of the competitors and the number and size of other competitors.").
131. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 25 (emphasis in original).
132. Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S.
917 (1974); Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
133. Davidow, United States Antitrust Laws and International Transfers ofTechnology-the
Government View, 43 FoRDwHAm L. Rav. 733, 739 (1975). For another criticism, see L. SULLI-
vAN, ANTITRUST 538-39 (1977).
134. Turner, supranote 129.
135. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United States v. Manufactur-
ers Aircraft Ass'n, Inc., [1977] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,072, at 53,464 (S.D.N.Y., filed
Mar. 29, 1972) (complaint), 40 Fed. Reg. 30,838 (1975) (consent decree); United States v. Auto-
mobile Mfrs. Ass'n, [1969] Trade Cas. T72,907 (C.D. Cal. 1969) ("smog" case consent decree);
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), supplemental
opinion, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See also In reMultidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution,
[1973] 2 Trade Cas. 74,819 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (joint ventures and cross-licensing but no evi-
dence of delay in development of pollution control device), noted in 20 WAYNE L. REv. 1321
(1974). See Note, Joint Research Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws 39 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv.
1112 (1972); Letter from Thomas E. Kauper, then Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Phil E. Gilbert, Jr., Esq. (Dec. 15, 1975) (business review letter regarding
design, development, manufacture, and sale of jet engines) (copy on file at the offices of the
Cornell International Law Journal).
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se unreasonable and should be examined individually to determine their
competitive merits. According to Mr. Baker:
The scope of the pool is clearly important to the antitrust inquiry. An in-
dustry-wide pool is more likely to raise antitrust problems than a limited
pool of a few members. Where the pool covers only a limited number of
interfering patents, clearly it can gain some legitimacy from settling compet-
ing claims. Where it covers future as well as present patents, however, and
where it operates for a very long period of time, the pool looks increasingly
like a sort of nonaggression pact between the various elements of an indus-
try. 136
In contrast to the detail of this statement, the general rule stated in the
Guide-that "aggregations of patents cannot be used to create broad terri-
torial allocations going beyond any single patent or discrete group of pat-
ents"137-does not provide much guidance. It leaves unanswered the
questions of when there is an "aggregation" of patents, when there are
"broad territorial allocations," and what a "discrete group of patents" is.
3. Manufacturing Joint Venture and Know-How License. Case E
Case E 13 8 hypothesizes a joint venture between a large Japanese indus-
trial combine and an American transistor manufacturer to produce transis-
tors in Japan, using the American firm's know-how. The Guide discusses
the "perceived potential entrant" branch of the potential competition doc-
trine,139 but fails to mention the "actual potential entrant." It notes that,
unlike the situation in Case C, the "joint venture by itself does not appear
to be any part of a broader arrangement to divide world markets .... -140
According to the Guide:
One measure for insuring that the restraint is truly no longer in duration than
necessary, is to limit an ancillary territorial restraint of this type to no longer
than the time it would take for [the foreign venturer] to develop the
equivalent know-how itself (the "reverse engineering" period). Where the
restraint exceeds the reverse engineering period, a defendant must be pre-
pared to bear the burden of proving the necessity of the restraint. 141
Although the reverse engineering period is a helpful concept, it is imprecise.
One commentator has noted that the Guide's discussion of reverse engi-
neering
presumes that it is possible to predetermine this "reverse-engineering" period
of time regardless of the product that may be involved, whether it be a nu-
clear power generating facility or a better mousetrap. Aside from the tech-
nological difficulties in accurately forecasting when someone else can come
136. Remarks by Baker, supra note 129.
137. ANTITRUST GuIDE, supra note I, at 27.
138. Id at 28.
139. Id at 29.
140. Id at 28-29.
141. Id at 31.
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up with a better mousetrap, there are questions of financial capability to sup-
port the necessary research and development to successfully complete such a
project. Even if a comparable product is developed independently of the
originally licensed product, there are marketing considerations which have to
be overcome, including possible brand name loyalties and the organization
of sales and service outlets, before the newly developed product can be truly
competitive with the licensed product.142
Moreover, in some situations there is no realistic possibility that the licensee
could ever develop the transferred technology on its own. In light of these
difficulties, a more appropriate limitation period would be that during
which the transferred know-how remains secret.
The Guide's discussion of possible justifications for ancillary territorial
restraints fails to take sufficient account of United States v. E. duPont de
Nemours & Co.14 3 and United States v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc. 144 Both cases suggest that reasonable territorial limitations essential to
the success of an otherwise justifiable joint venture are lawful, whereas ter-
ritorial limitations not essential to the venture's success, but intended
merely to protect joint venture patents from competition, will be struck
down.
The analysis of Case E also indicates that if the venturers could prove
that the "know-how being transferred is of substantial value,"'145 then it
might be lawful to prohibit the Japanese venturer from exporting Japanese
transistors to the United States. However, the Guide's discussion of Case
F 146 states that "[blecause know-how licensing lacks the protections and
legislative mandate of the patent system . . . , know-how licenses will in
general be subject to antitrust standards which, if anything, are stricter than
those applied to patent licenses." 147 The Chief of the Antitrust Division's
Intellectual Property Section has noted that, with the exception of the "nine
142. Seki, The Justice Department's New Antitrust Guide for International Operations-A4
Summary and Evaluatiot? 32 Bus. LAW. 1633, 1653-54 (1977) (footnote omitted). For another
criticism of the reverse engineering concept, see Fugate, The Department of Justice's Antitrust
Guidefor International Operations 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645, 674 (1977).
143. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), a fft 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
144. 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on primaryjurisdiction groundg 371 U.S. 296(1963).
145. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 31.
146. Seenotes 151-55 infra and accompanying text.
147. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 33-34 (emphasis added). For a previous, appar-
ently contradictory statement of Antitrust Division enforcement policy, see Davidow, Antitrust
and International Patent Licensing, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 530, 537 (1974) (the Antitrust Divi-
sion's position is that "know-how and trade secrets may not be licensed with restrictions
greaterthan those which would raise antitrust problems in regard to the licensing of patents."
(emphasis added)); U.S. Dep't of Justice Memorandum, supra note 5, at 55,208 ("Where
know-how and patents are both involved and are closely related it is usually possible to impose
the samerestriction on the know-how as those permitted for the accompanying patents." (em-
phasis added)).
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no-no's,"' 48 patent licenses are analyzed pursuant to the rule of reason:
"For restrictions in a know-how license to be subject to stricter antitrust
standards than a patent license must therefore mean that they are subject to
something stricter than the rule of reason. What would that be?"' 149
The same official has further noted that in a recent trial brief the Govern-
ment asserted that "'[a] territorial allocation that gives one party. . . the
power to determine the sales territory of its actual or potential competitor
. . . is thus illegal per se. This rule applies regardless of whether the quid
pro quo for the territorial restraint is . . . agreeing to transmit know-
how.' "150
D. CASES F, G, H, & I: INTERNATIONAL LICENSING
L Know-How License. Case F
Case F' 5 ' involves a small Massachusetts corporation that possesses val-
uable unpatented technology, which it licenses to a major German manu-
facturer. Although most of the issues raised by this hypothetical have
already been discussed, two points merit consideration here.
First, the Guide states that "[t]he exclusion of overseas suppliers of the
tied items from overseas sales normally does not constitute U.S. foreign
commerce, and hence, their exclusion is not prohibited by U.S. antitrust
law." 52 The use of the word "normally" and the implication that the ex-
clusion of overseas suppliers would in some cases constitute U.S. foreign
commerce create an important and unresolved ambiguity that, because of
its significance, deserves more detailed discussion.
Second, in discussing section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930,153 the Guide
notes that "the Department would look with considerable suspicion upon
the use of Section 526 to exclude identical German trademarked goods
.... ,,1-4 But the Guide also remarks that a territorial restriction prohibit-
Ing the German licensee from competing with the licensor in the United
States would be reasonable if the restriction were limited to the reverse en-
gineering time. If such a territorial restriction would be permissible, why
148. For a list ofthe "nine no-no's," see Morse, IsAntitrust RealoAnti-patent?, 55 CHI BAR
REc. 154, 157 (1974).
149. Address by Richard H. Stem, then Chief, Patent Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, before the Electronics Industries Ass'n Conference on Technology Transfer in Transi-
tion, International Licensing and the New Antitrust Guidefor International Operations 19 (Dec.
8, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
150. Id. at 21. See generally Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, Antitrust and the InternationalLicens-
ing of Trade Secrets and Know-How: .A Needfor Guidelne4 9 LAW & POL'Y IN-T'L Bus. 725
(1977).
151. AnITRusT GuIDE, supranote 1, at 33.
152. Id at 35 (emphasis added).
153. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1976).
154. ANTITRUST GuIDE, supranote I, at 36.
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would it be unreasonable for the licensor to invoke section 526 to exclude
trademarked goods for the same period of time?
2. Tying of Licensed Technology: Case G
In Case G,155 a major American manufacturer requires of its licensee, a
local enterprise in a less developed country, that the licensee purchase from
the licensor all components, supplies, and equipment necessary to manufac-
ture goods under the license. As a further means of boosting its income
from the license, the licensor also requires the licensee to purchase unre-
lated patents. Although not essential to this case, a consideration of the
difference in jurisdictional criteria between section 1 of the Sherman Act
and section 3 of the Clayton Act would have made the Guide more useful,
since the Clayton Act's requirements that the goods be in commerce and be
for use within the United States are sometimes overlooked.
Also absent is any treatment of the use of a trademark to tie the sale of
unwanted supplies or equipment and the applicability of such cases as
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. 156 to international licenses. Finally, the dis-
cussion of mandatory package licensing contains a cryptic reference "to
something less than a per se prohibition."' 157 As in the discussion of the
know-how licensing case,158 the Guide is unnecessarily confusing, since this
statement could easily be read to indicate that there is some unstated test of
legality, stricter than the rule of reason, yet less strict than a per se prohibi-
tion.
In his rejoinder,' 5 9 Mr. Baker states that he does not believe that this
aspect of the Guide is confusing, because "fi]n the real world, there is in-
deed a never-never land between strict per se and full rule of reason
.*..,,60 But his explanation of this never-never land of "soft core" per se
situations appears to be an explanation of the thought processes of judges
and not a statement of a test of illegality recognized in the cases. My con-
tention that the Guide is confusing on this point would seem to be sup-
ported by the previously quoted statement of the Chief of the Antitrust
Division's Intellectual Property Section.' 6 '
155. Id at 37.
156. 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), modfe4 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denie4
405 U.S. 955 (1972).
157. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 38.
158. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
159. Baker, Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A Rejoinder, 11 CORNELL INt'L L.J. 255 (1978).
160. Id at 259.
161. Seenote 149 supra and accompanying text.
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3. Licensing a State-Owned Enterprise. Case H
Case H162 deals with an American company that licenses the use of its
unpatented technology to a government agency in a country having a non-
market economy, but prohibits export of goods produced under the license
to the United States. The Guide concludes that the permanent prohibition
of sales into the United States is of questionable legality. The major diffi-
culty with the analysis that follows this conclusion is its overstatement of
the protection afforded the American licensor under existing antidump-
ing163 and countervailing duty' 64 statutes. Many commentators have
noted that these remedies are expensive, time-consuming, and often easily
circumvented.' 65 American industry should not have to forego more effec-
tive and cost-efficient contractual remedies, in order to placate the fears of
antitrust enforcement officials that the contractual provisions contain hid-
den restrictions.
The Guide also suggests that a licensor protect himself by including in
the license a provision for "an increase in royalties based on increased pro-
duction and sales . ... ,166 Were this not the Division's suggestion, one
could well argue that such a provision is a thinly veiled territorial restric-
tion, prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act.
4. Exclusive Grantback Licensing.- Case I
In Case 1,167 use of patents and know-how under a license from an
American company is conditioned upon the licensee's granting back any
new patents or know-how it develops that relate to the licensed technology
rights. The Guide's discussion of this case is clear and helpful. The test of
the legality of the grantback provision, according to the Guide, is whether
the licensor effectively controls the licensee. Where such control exists, the
grantback term is unobjectionable as a "matter of internal organization." 68
If the licensor and licensee are unaffiliated, the case is "broadly analogous
to Timken."'169 Where they are unaffiliated but the licensee is capable of
competing with the licensor in the United States, the grantback provision is
"likely to be per se illegal."' 170
162. ANTITRUST GumE, supranote 1, at 40.
163. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976).
164. Id § 1303.
165. See, e.g, Applebaum, The Antldumping Laws-Impact on the Competitive Process, 43
ANTrrRUST L.J. 590, 602 (1974).
166. ANTITRUST GuIDE, supranote 1, at 41.
167. Id at 42.
168. Id at 45.
169. Id
170. Id
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Any analogy between an exclusive grantback from a potential competitor
and the Tinken case is very broad indeed, since Case I does not contain any
suggestion of the kind of comprehensive scheme to suppress trade that was
crucial in Timken. The simple fact that a licensee is a potential competitor
should not be equated with the facts of Timken.
E. CASE J: EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIPS
Case J171 involves an agreement between American and German
machine tool manufacturers under which each appoints the other its exclu-
sive distributor in the other's market. After noting that territorial alloca-
tions among competitors are per se unreasonable, the Guide states that such
a per se treatment should also apply to exclusive distributorship agreements
between American and foreign manufacturers if "each party is a substantial
manufacturer who can (or could) compete in the territory of the other."'172
The Guide does not, however, explain what factors the Division would
consider in determining whether this test is met. Nor does it specify the
degree of potentiality required before per se treatment would apply. Must
the foreign manufacturer be an "actual potential entrant" in the U.S. mar-
ket as defined in BOC International73 before the per se prohibition ap-
plies? Would the Division weigh the special problems of foreign entry into
American markets' 74 in evaluating the degree of potentiality?
The Guide also states that if the companies are not competing producers
of the goods involved in the distributorship, then a "full factual inquiry
would probably be required under the rule of reason to determine whether
the effect of the arrangement was significantly to promote or limit (i) mar-
ket competition in the United States or (ii) U.S. firms' ability to compete
abroad."17 5 This formulation is not the traditional focus of a rule of reason
inquiry.176 Although the two factors mentioned are relevant, they are not
the only pertinent factors. As the Supreme Court recently stated in Conti-
nental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,17 7 under the rule of reason "the
factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable re-
171. Id at 46-49.
172. Id at 47.
173. 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977). Seenotes 109-10 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 48 & 50 supra.
175. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 48 (emphasis added).
176. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated the classic formulation of the rule of reason in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ('The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."). This statement of the rule
was quoted with approval in National Soc. of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 46
U.S.L.W. 4356 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1978).
177. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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straint on competition."' 178
Another issue presented by Case J is the legality of each party restricting
exportation of its products by its other domestic distributors so that one
party's products, exported initially to a third country, are not reexported to
the exclusive distribution area of the other party. Relying on United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,179 the Guide states that "the first arms-length sale
of a product exhausts the seller's right to restrain those to whom it may be
resold."' 8 0  After the Guide was written, the Supreme Court expressly
overruled Schwinn in Continental TV ., 181 rejecting Schwinn's per se ap-
proach to nonprice vertical restrictions and mandating a "return to the rule
of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn."' 8 2  The
Guide's position on this issue is thus of little present significance.
Important questions relating to exclusive distributorships are not ad-
dressed by the Guide, including vertical territorial restrictions, customer re-
strictions, and profit passovers. The Guide also fails to consider the status of
field-of-use restraints on purchasers and marketing restrictions in patent
licenses in light of Continental T V18 3
F. CASES K, L, M, & N: FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
The Guide's last four cases analyze three related issues which implicate
foreign governments in anticompetitive conduct. Case K 184 hypothesizes
that an American oil company complies with a foreign government's ban
on sales of oil to a specified U.S. oil refiner and sells instead to others in the
same market at a price set by the foreign government. Case L185 involves a
cartel formed by seven or eight ore producers, only one of which is incorpo-
rated in the United States, but all of which, directly or indirectly, market
their ore in the United States. In Case M,186 five major oil companies orga-
nize a joint venture to provide a backup commitment of oil for use if politi-
cal events in countries where their operations are located jeopardize any
member's production. Case N' 87 examines a tariff increase or embargo
imposed by a foreign government to strengthen a local industry on the rec-
178. Id at 49 (footnote omitted).
179. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
180. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at 49.
181. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
182. Id at 59.
183. For one commentator's speculation on these issues, see Remarks of James H. Wallace,
Jr., before the Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Ass'n, Recent Developments in Patent
and Trademark Antitrust Law (Aug. 10, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell Interna.
tional Law Journal).
184. ANTITRUST GumE, supra note 1, at 50.
185. Id at 53.
186. Id at 58.
187. Id at 62.
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ommendation of industry members, including a wholly owned subsidiary of
a U.S. company.
1. Act of State Defense
The act of state defense is not a rule of international law, but an excep-
tion to conflict of laws principles that is based upon comity. The act of
state doctrine provides that "courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory."188
The doctrine's "major underpinning. . is the policy of foreclosing court
adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their own
soil that might embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the
conduct of our foreign relations."189 Although applied primarily in cases
not presenting antitrust issues, 190 the doctrine was crucial to the decision in
Interamerican Refning Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.191 Much as in the
Guide's Case K, the Venezuelan Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons had
instructed defendants Texaco and Monsanto not to ship crude oil to plain-
tiff Interamerican for refining. When Texaco and Monsanto refused to sell
to middleman Amoco Trading Company for resale to Interamerican, Inter-
american sued all three companies for treble damages alleging an illegal
boycott. Because the Venezuelan authorities compelled the boycott, the
district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. In
doing so, it rejected Interamerican's contention that compulsion would be a
complete defense only if the acts of compulsion were valid under Venezue-
lan law. The court stated that the act of state doctrine barred the inquiry
necessary to determine the validity of the Venezuelan Ministry's actions.192
The Guide would limit the availability of the act of state defense in three
ways: (1) the defense would not apply to "an act inside the United
States";' 93 (2) the act would have to be that of "a truly sovereign entity
acting within the scope of its powers under the law of its nationality"; 19a
and (3) the defense would not apply to "'commercial' actions of a foreign
government or instrumentality, but only to its public, political actions."195
Although the Antitrust Division understandably seeks to limit antitrust de-
188. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See generally 6 M. WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-54 (1968); Swan, Act of State at hay: A Plea on Behafof
the Elusive Doctrine 1976 DuKE L.J. 807; Comment, The Act ofState Doctrine: .A History of
Judicial Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 677 (1977).
189. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976).
190. See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 707 (1972).
191. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
192. Id at 1299.
193. ANTrrRUST GuIDE, supra note 1, at 54.
194. Id
195. Id at 55.
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fenses as much as possible, each of these three limitations is nevertheless
subject to challenge.
The first restriction-that the defense does not protect acts within the
United States-is acceptable in the context of expropriation cases. 196 But it
is irrelevant to the more pressing question of whether the act of state de-
fense protects the extraterritorial effect in the United States of a foreign
sovereign's act within its own territory. Several courts have recognized that
a foreign state's act may have an effect outside that state's territory yet not
bar the act of state defense.197 In Interamerican Refning,198 the Venezue-
lan Government's acts took place within Venezuela, but their effects ex-
tended to the United States. The district court concluded that act of state
was a complete defense, because "[w]hen a nation compels a trade practice,
firms there have no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively
acts of the sovereign."' 199
The second limitation that the Guide imposes upon the act of state de-
fense-that the act be that of a truly sovereign entity acting within the scope
of its powers-directly contradicts existing case law. By definition, the
doctrine precludes courts from adjudicating "the legality"20° or "passing on
the validity" 20 of the acts of foreign states. Yet a court must do just that if
it is to determine whether a foreign government has acted within the scope
of its powers.
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.202 illustrates the check that the act of state doc-
trine places upon a court's inquiry into whether the foreign sovereign's ac-
tions are within the scope of its authority. Hunt alleged that the
defendants, seven major integrated oil producers, had indirectly caused
Hunt's assets in Libya to be nationalized by the Libyan Government. The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hunt's antitrust
claim, stating that in order to dispose of the claim on its merits, the court
would have to examine "the motivation of the Libyan action and that inevi-
tably involves its validity. '20 3 But, the court said, the act of state doctrine
bars such an inquiry.2°4 In view of such clear statements that a court may
196. Maltina Corp. v. CAWY Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir.), cer. denie&4 409
U.S. 1060 (1972); Republic ofIraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denie4 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
197. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
modMe4 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970); Naamloze Vennootschap Suikerfabriek "Wono-Aseh" v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 111 F. Supp. 833, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
198. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). Seenotes 191-92 .supra and accompanying text.
199. 307 F. Supp. at 1298. See also Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315,
1324-25 (D. Conn. 1977).
200. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976).
201. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
202. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 608 (1977).
203. 550 F.2d at 77.
204. Id
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not examine the validity of foreign sovereign acts, the precedents do not
support the Guide's insistence on a "valid decree of a foreign govern-
ment"20 5 as a prerequisite for asserting the act of state defense.20 6
Similarly, the Guide's refusal to apply the act of state defense to "com-
mercial" acts of foreign sovereigns goes beyond existing law. Afred Dun-
hill of London, Inc., v. Republic of Cubd207 involved a suit by an American
importer of Cuban cigars to recover funds mistakenly paid for cigars sold
by certain Cuban cigar companies that had been expropriated by the Cuban
Government. The United States filed an amicus curiae brief in which it
took the position that the act of state doctrine should be held to apply to
governmental but not to commercial acts of foreign sovereigns. 208 This
position was supported by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State in
a letter attached to the Government's brief.209
This distinction between governmental and commercial activity is recog-
nized under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity210 and was codi-
fied in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.211 That statute
provides that a foreign sovereign is not entitled to sovereign immunity in
cases
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States.212
The Act defines "commercial activity" as "either a regular course of com-
205. ANTITRUST GuIDE, supranote 1, at 54.
206. The Justice Department filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Hunt's petition for a
writ of certiorari. In the brief, the Justice Department contended that:
[T]his case presents the important issue whether the act of state doctrine bars judicial
examination of the motives behind a foreign government's official acts. We submit that
it does not. While judicial examination of such motives raises some of the concerns
underlying the act of state doctrine, that doctrine only precludes judicial examination
of the validity or legality of such acts under appropriate legal principles. Petitioners'
third claim does not require any inquiry into the validity of the Libyan government's
act in any way that implicates the act of state doctrine.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 7. The Supreme Court denied the petition for
a writ of certiorari. 98 S. Ct. 608 (1977).
207. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
208. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 41-42.
209. The letter is reprinted as an Appendix to the Court's Opinion. 425 U.S. at 706-11.
210. See generally Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign Before United States Courts, 38 FoRD-
HAM L. REv. 455 (1970); Comment, Restrictive Sovereign Immunity, The State Department,
and the Court4 62 Nw. U.L. Rav. 397 (1967); Comment, Sovereign Immunityfor Commercial
Instrumentalities of Foreign Government4 58 YALE L. J. 176 (1948).
211. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976). See generally Atkenson, Perkins, & Wyatt, H.R
11315-The Revised State-Justice Bllon Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Timefor Actiom. 70 Am.
J. INT'L L. 298 (1976).
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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mercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act,"'21 3 and pro-
vides that the nature of the conduct, rather than its purpose, is the
determinative criterion.214
Despite the contentions of the Justice and State Departments in Dunhill
that the governmental/commercial distinction should apply to act of state
situations, a majority of the Court held that there was insufficient evidence
in the record to establish that the repudiation of the debt, by the persons
named by the Cuban Government to operate the expropriated businesses,
was an act of state by the Cuban Government.215 Mr. Justice White,
speaking for only four members of the majority, went further. He noted
that it was unlikely that embarrassing intrusions by the judiciary into the
executive's conduct of foreign relations would arise in matters involving the
purely commercial conduct of foreign governments, because many other
countries have also adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
and the governmental/commercial act distinction.
Of equal importance is the fact that subjecting foreign governments to the
rule of law in their commercial dealings presents a much smaller risk of af-
fronting their sovereignty than would an attempt to pass on the legality of
their governmental acts. In their commercial capacities, foreign govern-
ments do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise
only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens. Subjecting
them in connection with such acts to the same rules of law that apply to
private citizens is unlikely to touch very sharply on 'national nerves' ....
For all the reasons which led the Executive Branch to adopt the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, we hold that the mere assertion of sovereignty
as a defense to a claim arising out of purely commercial acts by a foreign
sovereign is no more effective if given the label "Act of State" than if it is
given the label "sovereign immunity. '2 16
The Guide acknowledges that distinguishing governmental from com-
mercial acts may be difficult and "may turn in part on questions of foreign
law, custom, and practice." 2 17 Elsewhere, the Guide notes that such dis-
tinctions may be hard to draw "unless the two sovereigns distinguish the
two concepts in a similar way."2 18 Although Antitrust Division officials
have recognized the vagueness of the governmental/commercial distinc-
tion,2 19 the Guide offers no guidance on how private parties should deter-
213. Id § 1603(d) (1976).
214. Id For a recent antitrust case involving commercial acts of a foreign sovereign see
United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., No. 77-197 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1977),
[19771 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CC-I) 45,077 (case no. 2560, 2561) (complaint noted); [1977] 5
TRADE REG. REP. (CCII) 50,353 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 9, 1977) (consent decree) (suit against
airlines, including the government-owned Lufthansa German Airlines, for price-fixing on cer-
tain military excursion fares).
215. 425 U.S. at 690.
216. Id at 703-05.
217. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 8 n.21.
218. Id at 55 n.98.
219. "[H]ow do we distinguish ambiguous conduct which has both significant commercial
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mine whether the conduct of a foreign government with which they are
dealing is governmental or commercial. It also fails to suggest how to de-
termine whether the act of state doctrine protects the conduct of a foreign
governmental commission, board, agency, or government-owned com-
pany.220
The Guide also suggests that in some cases, even if there is an act of state,
the overriding importance of enforcing the antitrust laws should bar use of
the defense. Mr. Rosenthal has stated that there are some "forms of for-
eign governmental conduct which, though more nearly political than com-
mercial, and, although undertaken within the territory of that foreign
government, should nonetheless not be the basis of nullifying the role of
our courts." 2 2 1  United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.222 supports this view,
according to Mr. Rosenthal.223 But Sisal Sales did not involve a situation
where the Court refused to recognize an act of state. The discriminatory
legislation procured by the defendants was not the target of the Govern-
ment's complaint. The Court stated:
The United States complain of a violation of their laws within their own
territory by parties subject to their jurisdiction, not merely of something done
by another government at the instigation of private parties. True, the con-
and political characteristics-for example, the issuance of government bonds to raise funds for
a railroad?" Address by Douglas E. Rosenthal, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Committee, U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce (Mar. 9, 1977), reprinted in [1977] 5 TRADE Rao. REP. (CCH) 1 50,309, at
55,653. "Some would argue that any truly important economic activity is necessarily 'political,'
since most countries today view the management of their own economies as a central mission
of government." Baker, Antitrust Remedies Against Government-Inspired Boycotts, Shortages,
and Squeezes: Wandering on the Road to Mecca, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 911, 931 (1976).
220. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir. 1976), the
court held that judicial proceedings instituted by a private party in Honduran courts and sub-
sequent actions were not acts of Honduras. See also Cofinco Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., [1975]
2 Trade Cas. 60,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For one analysis of these issues, see Baker, Sovereign
Compulsion, the Noerr Doctrine and Government Cartelizing, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
17TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTrrRUST LAW SEMINAR 95, 99-101 (1977).
The governmental/commercial distinction is of little utility when dealing with nonmarket
economies and developing nations. See, e.g, article 5 of the U.N. General Assembly's Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States:
All States have the right to associate in organizations of primary commodity pro-
ducers in order to develop their national economies, to achieve stable financing for
their development and, in pursuance of their aims, to assist in the promotion of sus-
tained growth of the world economy, in particular accelerating the development of
developing countries. Correspondingly, all States have the duty to respect that right by
refraining from applying economic and political measures that would limit it.
G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See alsoPerma-
nent sovereignty over natural resources, G.A. Res. 3171, para. 4, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
30) 52, 53, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). See generally Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of
Nation-State Cartels Under U.S. Antitrust and Public International Law, 9 INT'L LAW. 617
(1975).
221. Address by Rosenthal, supra note 219.
222. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
223. Address by Rosenthal, supra note 219.
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spirators were aided by discriminating legislation, but by their own deliber-
ate acts, here and elsewhere, they brought about forbidden results within the
United States.
224
Mr. Rosenthal has, however, also noted that his position raises important
unanswered questions: "[H]ow many and what kinds of contacts with
United States commerce overcome an act of state defense, where foreign
governments are involved in their own backyard, cannot now be stated pre-
cisely. We need more experience with concrete factual situations." 225
2 Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
Closely related to the act of state doctrine is the defense of foreign sover-
eign compulsion. Whereas the former is based upon judicial noninterfer-
ence in the conduct of foreign affairs and focuses on the acts of a foreign
sovereign, the latter is grounded on common law principles of fairness, du-
ress, and comity. The foreign sovereign compulsion defense focuses on the
acts of nonsovereign bodies that are compelled by sovereign entities. The
two defenses are often treated as one, principally because many courts con-
sider acts compelled by foreign sovereigns to be, in effect, acts of that
state.2
2 6
The only reported case that has unequivocally recognized the defense of
foreign sovereign compulsion is Interamerican Refning.227 The district
court there held that "[a]nticompetitive practices compelled by foreign na-
tions are not restraints of commerce, as commerce is understood in the
Sherman Act."'228 The uncontroverted facts established that defendants
had neither procured the Venezuelan order nor acted voluntarily pursuant
to a delegation of authority from the Venezuelan Government. Conse-
quently, sovereign compulsion was held to be a complete defense.
The Guide states the Justice Department's belief that InteramericanRefining was "wrongly decided" 229 and the Antitrust Division's policy that
the foreign sovereign compulsion defense should be limited to situations
where: (1) the acts complained of were "commanded," not merely "en-
couraged," by a foreign sovereign; (2) the acts took place within the foreign
state's territory; (3) the "command" was legal under the foreign sovereign's
law; (4) "the company [was] being reasonable in doing what it felt it had to
224. 274 U.S. at 276 (1927).
225. Address by Rosenthal, supra note 219.
226. See, e.g, Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298
(D. Del. 1970). See generally Timberg, Sovereign Immunity andAct of State Defenses: Trans-
national Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 Tax. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1976); Graziano, Foreign
Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100
(1967); Note, Development of the Defense of Sovereign Compulsiog 69 MICH. L. REV. 888
(1971).
227. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). See notes 191-92 supra and accompanying text.
228. Id at 1298.
229. ANTRrUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 52.
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do;"' 230 and (5) "a balancing of the comity interests of Restatement Section
40 results in greater deference" to the foreign sovereign than to American
antitrust law.23 1 As with the Guide's limitations on the act of state doc-
trine, each of these restrictions on the foreign sovereign compulsion defense
is subject to challenge.
The requirement that the restraint be commanded by the sovereign is
well established. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,2 3 2 a plurality of the
Supreme Court held that Detroit Edison so influenced the Michigan State
Public Service Commission's decision to impose the challenged restraint
that the restraint was not "compelled" by the state, and therefore was sub-
ject to the antitrust laws. The test, according to the Court, is whether "the
private party exercised sufficient freedom of choice to enable the Court to
conclude that he should be held responsible for the consequences of his
decision." 233
This standard is difficult to apply fairly in international situations, z34
230. Id at 55.
231. Id RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 (1965) provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each
state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exer-
cise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the
other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
232. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
233. Id at 593. Judge Van Graafeiland of the Second Circuit has read this passage from the
Cantor opinion to apply to foreign governments because, in a footnote, the Court had cited
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). Hunt v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 80 (2d Cir.) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied 98 S. Ct. 608
(1977).
234. In several other cases, defendants have attempted to demonstrate compulsion, but have
failed to sustain their burden of proof. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), plaintiff Continental Ore alleged that Union Carbide's subsidiary,
which had been appointed by the Canadian Government as the exclusive wartime agent to
purchase and allocate vanadium for Canadian industries, had eliminated the plaintiff from the
Canadian vanadium market by refusing to purchase vanadium from Continental Ore. Both
the trial court and court of appeals ruled that, even if the Canadian subsidiary's activities were
such as to enhance a monopolistic plan affecting the United States, the company was acting as
an arm of the Canadian Government, so that its activities were not within the purview of the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the Canadian subsid-
iary's anticompetitive activities had not been approved or directed by the Canadian Govern-
ment and that the mere fact that the company was acting in a manner permitted by Canadian
law did not insulate the activity from the Sherman Act. The Court stated: "[t~here is nothing to
indicate that [the Canadian law] in any way compelled discriminatory purchasing, and it is
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since many countries have unwritten systems of "administrative guidance,"
"advice," or "traditional methods," which have the same binding effect as
statutes. The Guide's limitation of the foreign sovereign compulsion de-
fense to actions taken pursuant to a "valid decree" and actions of a "non-
governmental agent of a foreign government" who is "authorized to per-
form the alleged acts of state as a delegated sovereign function"235 may,
therefore, be too narrow and rigid in the complex and subtle world of inter-
national business transactions.
The Antitrust Division has rationalized the second requirement, that the
challenged acts must occur within the foreign state, by arguing that the anti-
well settled that acts which are in themselves legal lose that character when they become con-
stituent elements of an unlawful scheme." 370 U.S. at 707.
United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., [1963] Trade Cas.
1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modofed, [1965] Trade Cas. 70,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (the
Swiss Watch case) also involved an analysis of whether conduct was compelled by a foreign
sovereign. The alleged conspirators-manufacturers and sellers of Swiss watches and watch
parts and their trade associations-had, over a period of years, entered into successive private
agreements that were designed to protect the Swiss watch industry and to prevent the growth
of competitive watch industries in the United States and elsewhere. The basis of the complaint
was an agreement known as the "Collective Convention," executed in Switzerland, which was
intended to, and did, restrict unreasonably the manufacture of watches and watch parts in the
United States, and restrain U.S. imports and exports of watches and watch parts for both
manufacturing and repair purposes. Various other restrictive practices were charged. The
Swiss Government passed legislation to aid the Convention's signatories, providing that any
signatory who breached any of the Convention's provisions was subject under Swiss law to
private sanctions provided in the Convention.
Defendants claimed that the court should not have assumed jurisdiction over their activities
because the agreements were entered into and became effective in Switzerland, and were sanc-
tioned by Swiss law. The district court responded that if "the defendants' activities had been
required by Swiss law, this court could indeed do nothing." Id at 77,456. The challenged
agreements, however, had been formulated privately, without compulsion by the Swiss Gov-
ernment. Moreover, the fact that the private agreements were recognized, and even approved
of, by the Swiss Government was insufficient to "convert what is essentially a vulnerable pri-
vate conspiracy into an unassailable system resulting from foreign governmental mandate." Id
at 77,457. The court held that "[in the absence of direct foreign governmental action compel-
ling the defendants' activities, a United States court may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts and
contracts abroad, if. . . such acts and contracts have a substantial and material effect upon
our foreign and domestic commerce." Id
See also Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). The Sabre Shipping case involved a suit by an independent shipping line
against members of two shipping conferences alleging that the defendants unreasonably re-
strained and monopolized Hong Kong-United States and Japan-United States shipping trade
by charging unreasonably low rates. In denying motions to dismiss the complaint, the trial
court noted that whether Japanese defendants engaged in unlawful activities at the direction of
the Japanese Government was a matter for defense, "which even if established in their favor
would not necessarily immunize them from prosecution or civil responsibility for acts done in
United States commerce." Id at 954.
In Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977), the World Hockey
Association (WHA) prohibited persons under age twenty from playing professional hockey for
any WHA team. The Canadian Minister of Health "endorsed" the regulation because he
wished to "discourage" the drafting of teenagers from the amateur leagues, but the district
court judge expressed doubt that this would provide antitrust immunity. Id at 1324.
235. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 54-55.
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trust laws represent a fundamental and important national policy and com-
ity does not, therefore, require the United States to treat a foreign
sovereign's command to engage in conduct in the United States as control-
ling here. The Division recently tested this position in United States v.
Bechtel Corp.,2 36 where it sought to enjoin an alleged conspiracy among
American construction contractors who allegedly refused to deal with
American subcontractors blacklisted by Arab League countries.23 7 There
are, however, at least three problems with this restriction. First, if the for-
eign sovereign compulsion defense is based upon fairness and freedom of
choice, why should the location of the conduct be determinative? Second,
as with the act of state defense, the Division's position offers no guidance
concerning conduct that occurs abroad but affects commerce within the
United States. Third, this limitation appears to be somewhat inconsistent
with another statement of Antitrust Division policy, that: "[W]e have gener-
ally followed for some years a policy against suing members of a foreign
export association for conduct which the U.S. would permit under the
Webb-Pomerene Act. .... -238 Such foreign export cartels by definition act
outside their countries and, often, inside the United States.
The Guide's explanation for its third requirement-that there be a
"valid" foreign command-differs somewhat from the rationale offered for
the same limitation in the act of state context. An invalid command
"reduces the 'command' to what amounts to 'informal encouragement' by
the foreign governmental officials. . . . [The command's validity] is an is-
sue which can bear on the good faith of the defendants, and the weight to
which the 'command' is entitled in adjudicating private activity under
it.' '239 Although the explanation differs, the limitation itself is flawed just
as in the act of state context, since the restriction conflicts with case law240
and would overextend the judicial inquiry.24'
The last two restrictions on the applicability of the foreign sovereign
compulsion defense--that the company act reasonably and that the inter-
ests of the foreign sovereign be balanced-reflect the Division's efforts to
make its applications of the doctrine flexible. The Guide, however, pro-
vides no assistance as to what constitutes reasonable conduct, or how con-
flicting sovereign interests are to be balanced. Moreover, it is unclear
236. United States v. Bechtel Corp., No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
237. A proposed consent judgment to settle the case has been pending final court approval
for more than a year. 42 Fed. Reg. 3716 (1977).
238. Letter from Donald I. Baker, supra note 22.
239. ANTITRUsT GuiDE, supranote 1, at 52.
240. Seenotes 200-01 supra and accompanying text.
241. Seenotes 202-05 supra and accompanying text.
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whether the Antitrust Division would apply the governmental/commercial
distinction to sovereign commands, so as to deny the foreign sovereign
compulsion defense to a company that obeys a commercial command. 24
2
3. Petitioning Foreign Governments
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine,243 according to the Guide, protects joint
"efforts to cause a foreign government to impose restraints on U.S. com-
merce." 244 The Guide qualifies this position, however, by further provid-
ing that the doctrine's exceptions also apply in international situations.245
On the issue of Noerr-Pennington protection for petitioning foreign gov-
ernments to restrain U.S. commerce, the courts are split. In OccidentalPe-
troleum v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,246 the court rejected defendants' contention
that their efforts to "induce and procure" the Ruler of Sharjah to make
certain claims of territorial ownership were protected under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. The doctrine, the court said, is based upon two ratio-
nales: "to avoid a construction of the antitrust laws that might trespass upon
the First Amendment right of petition," and to ensure that "law-making
organs retain access to the opinions of their constituents, unhampered by
collateral regulation. '247 According to the Occidental court, neither of
these situations was present; therefore, application of the Noerr-Penninglon
doctrine "appear[ed] inappropriate. ' 248 An opposite result, however, was
reached in United States v. AMAX, Inc.,249 where the district court found
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applicable to defendant's petitioning of the
Canadian Government to set production quotas and selling prices for pot-
ash.2 50
The Guide does not say whether the character of the government peti-
tioned affects the availability of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The
Occidental court appeared to approve of Professor Areeda's suggestion that
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies only when a democratic government
242. At one point, the Guide appears to indicate that the commercial command of a foreign
sovereign cannot be cited by entities seeking to invoke the foreign sovereign compulsion de-
fense: "For example, if the government of C in its capacity as majority shareholder in the
Natural Resources Group required that company's management to organize a commercial
cartel, this may be regarded as a 'non-sovereign' act." ANTITRUST GUIDE, Suprafnote 1, at 55
n.100.
243. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965). See generally Note,
Corporate Lobbyirts Abroad The Extraterritorial Application of Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Im.
muni y 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1254 (1973).
244. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 1, at 63.
245. Id
246. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
247. Id at 108.
248. Id
249. [1977] 1 Trade Cas. 61,467 (N.D. IlL. 1977).
250. Id at 71,799.
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is petitioned.251 An Antitrust Division spokesman has criticized the court's
position on this issue:
I find it exceedingly strange that a court could base a ruling upon such a
characterization of the essential quality of a foreign government, and in the
same decision dismiss an antitrust complaint based on the act of state doc-
trine, which is based upon judicial reluctance to avoid passing judgment on
the nature of specific acts of foreign governments. 52
The Guide, however, takes no position on this issue.
The Guide also does not state whether the Antitrust Division would per-
mit a company to invoke the Noerr-Pennington doctrine if the company had
petitioned a foreign government or a commercial governmental entity, such
as a state trading company, to take commercial actions.
In his rejoinder, Mr. Baker states that City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co.253 "sustained" the Guide's view that "the antitrust laws
do apply to 'commercial' actions of foreign governments or instrumentali-
ties. .... ,"254 I do not read City of Lafayette that broadly. The key factor
in the case was the relationship among the federal antitrust laws, the "state
action" exemption from those laws, and the question of when a state's sub-
divisions should be deemed to be entitled to that exemption. The majority
of the Court held that:
[T]he Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as
an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursu-
ant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly pub-
lie service.
[This decision] means only that when the State itself has not directed or
authorized an anticompetitive practice, the State's subdivisions in exercising
their delegated power must obey the antitrust laws.255
This case thus has little direct bearing on the issues of whose definition of
"commercial" governs in international situations and what deference the
foreign sovereign's definition is entitled to pursuant to comity.256 More-
over, as the Guide notes, "purely domestic decisions may not be readily
generalized to the international context." 257
A further issue that the Guide fails to address is whether the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine protects joint efforts to obtain governmental approval
or acquiescence in private restraints. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.2 58
251. 331 F. Supp. at 108 n.26.
252. Remarks by Farmer, supra note 65, at 55,689.
253. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
254. Baker, supranote 159, at 260.
255. 98 S. Ct. at 1137-38.
256. See notes 226-30 supra and accompanying text.
257. ANTITRUST Gum, supranote 1, at 1.
258. 274 U.S. 260 (1927).
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and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.259 suggest that such efforts are not entitled
to Noerr-Pennington protection.
CONCLUSION
The Antitrust Division's Guide is the result of the Division's laudable
intent to give guidance in a complex area. Much careful thought and anal-
ysis clearly went into the Guide's preparation, and as a result, it will un-
doubtedly strongly influence both antitrust counseling and court decisions.
Nevertheless, the Guide does not resolve all confusion and fears concerning
the application of American antitrust laws to international business opera-
tions.260 Many of the questions that it does not answer and that have been
raised in this Article do not have right or wrong answers. But raising and
discussing them may contribute to the dialogue between those who enforce
and those who must comply with the antitrust laws.
I am somewhat disappointed that Mr. Baker has received "very little
overall message" from this Article.26 1 But it may be that my critique and
Mr. Baker's rejoinder will illustrate the message I have attempted to con-
vey. I believe that the concept of a Guide is an excellent one, and that the
Guide itself reflects an excellent attempt to accomplish the goals it states. I
have attempted to set out in detail the specific aspects of the Guide that are
subject to challenge. It is my belief that such a point by point analysis is
the most useful way to highlight possible problems in the Guide.
This critique was not intended to present my philosophical views of the
antitrust laws or my personal experiences practicing law in the field of in-
ternational antitrust. Simply stated, my primary criticism of the Guide is
that it speaks in vague generalities that are useful in understanding the An-
titrust Division's priorities and concerns. But the Guide would be im-
mensely more useful if it also provided detailed discussions on specific
points. Unlike Mr. Baker, I believe that the brevity of the Guide does not
make it "useful to the ordinary person involved in an ordinary case."'26 2 In
fact, the brevity and generality of the Guide make it less useful than a
longer, more detailed document. The question is not whether the Guide is
a success, but whether it is the best success that could have been achieved.
259. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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